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1Abstract
We consider the problem of adjudicating con°icting claims in the
context of a variable population. A property of rules is \lifted" if
whenever a rule satis¯es it in the two-claimant case, and the rule is
bilaterally consistent, it satis¯es it for any number of claimants. We
identify a number of properties that are lifted, such as equal treatment
of equals, resource monotonicity, composition down and composition
up, and show that continuity, anonymity and self-duality are not lifted.
However, each of these three properties is lifted if the rule is resource
monotonic.
Keywords: claims problems; consistency; lifting; constrained equal
awards rule; constrained equal losses rule.
JEL classi¯cation number: C79; D63; D74
21 Introduction
We consider the problem of allocating a resource among agents having con-
°icting claims over it. An example is when the liquidation value of a bankrupt
¯rm has to be divided among its creditors. A \division rule" is a function
that associates with each situation of this kind, or \claims problem", a di-
vision of the amount available. This division is interpreted as the choice
that a judge or arbitrator could make. (The literature originates in O'Neill,
1982). Now, let us imagine that a rule has been applied to solve a certain
problem and that some agents leave with their awards. If the situation is
reevaluated at this point, the claims of the agents who stay are what they
were initially and the endowment is the di®erence between the initial en-
dowment and what the departing agents took with them. Alternatively, this
di®erence can be calculated as the sum of what the remaining agents have
been assigned. If, in this \reduced problem", the rule recommends for them
the same awards as initially, and if this is true no matter what the initial
problem is, and no matter who leaves, the rule is \consistent". An important
special case of this requirement, known as \bilateral consistency", is when
all but two claimants leave. It is the expression for the model at hand of a
general principle that has been central in developments that have occurred
in the last twenty years in game theory and the theory of resource allocation
(see Young, 1994; Thomson, 2006a). Our purpose is to contribute to the
understanding of its implications for division rules.
When studying any class of resource allocation problems or con°ict sit-
uations, it is a standard research strategy to ¯rst deal with the two-agent
case, and once a solution has been obtained for that case, to extend it to
general populations by means of bilateral consistency. The two-agent case is
conceptually and mathematically simpler. Indeed, the usually delicate issue
of how to deal with coalitions does not arise then. Also, the analysis takes
place in a space of lower dimension, often allowing the use of less sophisti-
cated mathematical tools. In the context of the problem under investigation,
this strategy has been followed by Dagan and Volij (1997), Moulin (2000),
Hokari and Thomson (2003), and Thomson (2003b).
In the course of implementing this extension strategy, it has been observed
in a number of contexts that if a two-agent solution is required to satisfy
a certain property and it has a bilaterally consistent extension, then this
extension satis¯es the property in general. We will say then that the property
is \lifted" from the two-agent case to the general case by bilateral consistency.
1Our objective here is to identify which properties of division rules are lifted,
and under what conditions.
We o®er two theorems. The ¯rst one lists properties that are lifted \di-
rectly" so to speak, the only requirements imposed on a rule being that it
satisfy the property in the two-claimant case and that it be bilaterally con-
sistent. We then identify several properties that are not lifted. For each of
them, we do so by constructing a bilaterally consistent rule that satis¯es the
property in the two-claimant case but not in the general case. The second
theorem gives a list of properties that are lifted provided the rule also satis-
¯es the requirement that, when the endowment increases, all agents should
receive at least as much as they received initially. We can then say that this
monotonicity property provides \assistance" in lifting other properties.
The properties of rules whose lifting we study are order properties, mono-
tonicity properties, and independence properties, including all of the proper-
ties that have been most often discussed in the recent axiomatic study of the
problem of adjudicating con°icting claims. They are mostly self-explanatory,
but a reader interested in detailed motivation and discussion should consult
the primary sources, which we cite when stating the properties, and the
surveys by Herrero and Villar (2001), Moulin (2002), and Thomson (2003a,
2006b).
An early example of lifting is given by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997).
We also note that Dagan and Volij (1997) have shown, and exploited the
fact, that certain properties of rules are lifted by a version of consistency
that they call \average consistency". A systematic investigation of lifting for
other models also appears to be a fruitful endeavor.
2 The model
There is an in¯nite set of \potential" claimants, indexed by the natural
numbers N. In each instance however, only a ¯nite number of them are
present. Let N be the class of ¯nite subsets of N. A claims problem with
claimant set N 2 N is a pair (c;E) 2 RN
+ £ R+ such that
P
N ci ¸ E:
c 2 RN
+ is the claims vector|for each i 2 N, ci being the claim of agent i|
and E 2 R+ is the endowment. Let CN be the class of these problems. A
rule is a function de¯ned on
S
N2N CN, which associates with each N 2 N
and each (c;E) 2 CN a vector x 2 RN
+ such that x 5 c and whose coordinates
2add up to E, a property to which we refer to as e±ciency.1;2 Any vector x
satisfying these two conditions is an awards vector for (c;E). For each
claims vector c 2 RN
+, the locus of the awards vector chosen by the rule when
the endowment varies from 0 to
P
ci is its path of awards for c.
The following property of a rule is the focus of our analysis. It says
that, starting from any initial problem, if all but two claimants receive their
awards as speci¯ed by the rule and leave, and the situation is reevaluated
at that point, the rule should assign to each of the two remaining claimants
the same amount as it did initially.3 The problem involving the subgroup of
remaining claimants is the reduced problem associated with the initial
recommendation and the subgroup.4
Bilateral consistency: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each N0 ½







The stronger version, consistency, is obtained by dropping the restriction
jN0j = 2.
It will be convenient to have available the following concept (Aumann and
Maschler, 1985): The dual of a rule S is the rule Sd de¯ned by setting,
for each N 2 N and each (c;E) 2 CN, Sd(c;E) ´ c ¡ S(c;
P
ci ¡ E). Two
properties are dual of each other if whenever a rule satis¯es one of them,
its dual satis¯es the other. A property is self-dual if it coincides with its
dual.
3 Lifting
Our ¯rst \lifting" theorem identi¯es a list of properties that, when satis¯ed
in the two-claimant case by a bilaterally consistent rule, is satis¯ed for any
number of claimants.
1Vector inequalities: x = y, x ¸ y, x > y.
2For surveys of the literature on division rules, see Thomson (2003a, 2006b).
3The many applications that have been made of the idea of consistency are surveyed
by Thomson (2006a). Early applications to the problem at hand are due to Aumann and
Maschler (1985) and Young (1987).
4Note that since we require rules to be such that for each i 2 N, xi 2 [0;ci], then
the sum of the claims of the agents who stay is still at least as large than the remaining
endowment, so the reduced problem is indeed a well-de¯ned claims problem.
3The weaker version of a property obtained by restricting its applications
to two-claimant problems is denoted with the pre¯x \2". For example, \2-
resource monotonicity", de¯ned shortly, means \resource-monotonicity in the
two-claimant case". However, we state all of our ¯xed-population properties
for rules as de¯ned above.
² We start with the requirement that two agents with equal claims should
receive equal amounts. This requirement is often imposed on rules. It is
not always desirable, for instance if claimants represent agents with di®erent
characteristics|say a taxpayer may be single or may be a married couple|
and the recent literature has considerably progressed so as to free us of it
(Moulin, 2000; Hokari and Thomson, 2003; Thomson, 2003b), but in many
applications, it is very natural.
Equal treatment of equals: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each
pair fi;jg µ N, if ci = cj, then Si(c;E) = Sj(c;E).
² If an agent's claim is at least as large as some other agent's claim, he should
receive at least as much. Also, the loss he incurs should be at least as large
as this other agent's loss. The requirement strengthens equal treatment of
equals.5
Order preservation: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each pair
fi;jg µ N, if ci ¸ cj, then Si(c;E) ¸ Sj(c;E) and ci ¡ Si(c;E) ¸ cj ¡
Sj(c;E).
² When the endowment increases, each claimant should receive at least as
much as he did initially:6
Resource monotonicity: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each
¹ E > E, if
P
cj ¸ ¹ E, then S(c; ¹ E) = S(c;E).
² Suppose that a rule has been applied to some problem but that when agents
show up to collect their awards, the endowment is found to be smaller than
initially thought. In handling this new situation, two perspectives can be
taken: (i) the initial division is ignored and the rule reapplied to the new
5This property is formulated by Aumann and Maschler (1985).
6Properties of this type are standard in all branches of game theory and economics.
For a survey, see Thomson (2003c).
4problem; (ii) the amounts initially assigned are used as claims in the division
of the new endowment. We require that both perspectives should result in
the same awards vector:7
Composition down: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each ¹ E < E,
we have S(c; ¹ E) = S(S(c;E); ¹ E).
We will use the obvious fact that a rule satisfying 2-composition down
satis¯es 2-resource monotonicity.8
² The next requirement pertains to the opposite possibility, namely that
when agents show up to collect their awards, the endowment is found to
be greater than initially thought. Here too, two perspectives can be taken:
(i) the initial division is ignored and the rule reapplied to the new problem;
(ii) each agent's award is calculated in two installments; the ¯rst installment
is his award for the division of the initial endowment; the second installment is
what he gets when the rule is applied to divide the newly available resources,
all claims being revised down by the ¯rst installments. We require that both
perspectives should result in the same awards vector:9
Composition up: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each ¹ E > E such
that
P
ci ¸ ¹ E, we have S(c; ¹ E) = S(c;E) + S(c ¡ S(c;E); ¹ E).10
Composition down and composition up are dual properties (Moulin, 2000;
Herrero and Villar, 2001).
It will help the proof of our lifting theorems to have available the following
result, whose proof we omit:
Lemma 1 If a property is lifted by bilateral consistency for any rule satisfy-
ing certain properties, the dual of the property is lifted for any rule satisfying
the dual properties.
7The property is formulated by Moulin (2000).
8This is because of the claims boundedness requirement S(c;E) 5 c imposed on rules.
This implication holds for any number of claimants, but we need it only in the two-claimant
case.
9The property is formulated by Young (1987).
10Note that this equality is well-de¯ned since by de¯nition, rules satisfy claims bound-
edness, that is, always select a vector that is dominated by the claims vector.
5Our ¯rst lifting theorem states that each of the properties just de¯ned is
lifted by bilateral consistency.11
Theorem 1 The following properties are lifted from the two-claimant case
to the general case by bilateral consistency:
(a) equal treatment of equals;
(b) order preservation;
(c) resource monotonicity;
(d) composition down and composition up.
Proof: We omit the proofs of (a) and (b), which are trivial.
(c) Resource monotonicity. The easy proof appears in Dagan, Serrano and
Volij (1997), but we include it for completeness. Let N 2 N with jNj ¸ 3,
(c;E) 2 CN, and ¹ E > E be such that ¹ E ·
P
ci. Let x ´ S(c;E) and
¹ x ´ S(c; ¹ E). Suppose by contradiction that for some i 2 N, ¹ xi < xi.
Then, there is j 2 N such that ¹ xj > xj. Let N0 ´ fi;jg. By bilateral
consistency applied twice, xN0 = S(cN0;
P
N0 xk) and ¹ xN0 = S(cN0;
P
N0 ¹ xk).
The two problems (cN0;
P
N0 xk) and (cN0;
P
N0 ¹ xk) (possibly) di®er only in
the endowment, and by 2-resource monotonicity, we should have ¹ xN0 = xN0
or ¹ xN0 5 xN0, which we know not to be true.
(d) Composition down. Let N 2 N with jNj ¸ 3, (c;E) 2 CN, ¹ E < E,
x ´ S(c;E), ¹ x ´ S(c; ¹ E), and y ´ S(x; ¹ E). We need to show that ¹ x = y.
We argue by contradiction.
Suppose that for some i 2 N, ¹ xi < yi. Then, there is j 2 Nnfig such that
¹ xj > yj. Let N0 ´ fi;jg. By bilateral consistency, xN0 = S(cN0;
P
N0 xk),
¹ xN0 = S(cN0;
P







N0 ¹ xk, then by 2-resource monotonicity (which, as we










N0 ¹ xk, then by 2-composition down, ¹ xN0 = S(xN0;
P
N0 ¹ xk).
By 2-resource monotonicity applied to (xN0;
P
N0 ¹ xk) and (xN0;
P
N0 yk), we
should have ¹ xN0 = yN0 or ¹ xN0 5 yN0, which we know not to be true.
The proof for composition up follows from the statement just proved, the
fact that this property is dual to composition down, and Lemma 1. ¤
11There is no logical relations between (a) and (b) of Theorem 1, even though the
properties that are lifted are logically related. The reason is that both hypotheses and
conclusions are strengthened as one passes from the statement pertaining to the ¯rst
property to the statement pertaining to the second property.
6Next, we identify several properties that are not lifted:
² The ¯rst one is another strengthening of equal treatment of equals. The
rule should be invariant under permutations of agents.
Anonymity: For each pair fN; ¹ Ng of elements of N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and
each ¹ c 2 R
¹ N, if there is a bijection ¼: N ! ¹ N such that for each i 2 N,
ci = ¹ c¼(i), then for each i 2 N, Si(c;E) = S¼(i)(¹ c;E).
Note that the idea can also be applied to the more limited case when
N = ¹ N.
² A small change in the endowment should not be accompanied by a large
change in the chosen awards vector:
Continuity: For each N 2 N, each sequence fEºg1
º=1, and each (c;E) 2 CN,
if Eº ·
P
N ci for each º 2 N, and Eº ! E, then S(c;Eº) ! S(c;E).
² What is available should be divided symmetrically to \what is missing"
(the di®erence between the sum of the claims and the endowment):12




We will show that none of the three properties just de¯ned is lifted. We
will actually provide a proof for these last two properties together, by means
of a single example.13 In de¯ning the example, we use the following rule as
an ingredient and the fact that it is bilaterally consistent.14




















where in each case, ¸ ¸ 0 is chosen so as to achieve e±ciency.
12This property is formulated by Aumann and Maschler (1985).
13Thus, in the language of Section 4, 2-anonymity provides no \assistance" in the lifting
of 2-continuity, nor does 2-continuity provide \assistance" in the lifting of 2-anonymity.
14The Talmud rule can be understood as a hybrid of the constrained equal awards rule
de¯ned later, and it dual, the so-called constrained equal losses rule. The former is applied
if the endowment is at most as large as the half-sum of the claims, and the other otherwise.
The reverse Talmud rule (Chun, Schummer, and Thomson, 2001) is de¯ned in a similar
way, but it starts with an application of the constrained equal losses rule, the constrained
equal awards rule being used second.
7Proposition 1 Neither 2-continuity nor 2-self-duality is lifted from the two-
claimant case to the general case by bilateral consistency.
Proof: The proof is by means of an example of a rule S de¯ned as follows.
Let N 2 N and (c;E) 2 CN.
Case (i): 1 62 N. Then, S(c;E) ´ T r(c;E).
Case (ii): N = f1;ig. Then, if ci ¸
c1
2 , the path of awards of S for c is








4 ), and c
(Figure 1a); otherwise it is the piecewise linear path connecting (0;0), (0;ci),
(
c1
2 ¡ ci;ci), (
c1
2 + ci;0), (c1;0), and c (Figure 1b).











S1(c;E) ´ 0, and for each i 2 N n f1g, Si(c;E) ´ T r
i (cNnf1g;E).

























Then, S1(c;E) ´ t, and for each i 2 Nnf1g, Si(c;E) ´ T r
i (cNnf1g;E¡ t),






















































Then, S1(c;E) ´ c1, and for each i 2 N nf1g, Si(c;E) ´ T r
i (cNnf1g;E ¡ c1).
Note that the reverse Talmud rule is continuous and self-dual. From this
fact and an inspection of Figure 1, we conclude that, in the two-claimant case,
S is continuous and self-dual. As Figure 2 shows, S is neither continuous nor
self-dual in general. Self-duality implies that when the endowment is equal







































































(d) i;j 6= 1 and ci > cj.






























































2 > cj > ci.
Figure 2: The three-claimant case. Self-duality and continuity are violated.
10not to be the case on the ¯gures;15 it is also for an endowment equal to the
half-sum of the claims that continuity is violated.
We assert that S is bilaterally consistent.
Let N 2 N with jNj ¸ 3, (c;E) 2 CN, x ´ S(c;E), and N0 ½ N with
jN0j = 2. We want to show that xN0 = S(cN0;
P
i2N0 xi). If 1 62 N0, then this
equality holds since the reverse Talmud rule is bilaterally consistent and for
each i 2 N n f1g, xi = T r
i (cNnf1g;E ¡ x1).
Suppose that N0 = f1;ig for some i 6= 1. Three of the 5 cases listed in
de¯ning the rule may apply to (c;E).

































It can be seen from Figure 1 that, in each of these cases, (x1;xi) lies on
the path of awards of S for (c1;ci). ¤
It follows directly from the de¯nition of consistency that if a rule satis¯es
this property, then for each population N 2 N with three or more agents,
each claims vector c 2 RN
+, and for each subpopulation N0 ½ N, the path of
awards of the rule for c, when projected onto RN0, is a subset of its path of
awards for the projection of c onto RN0, cN0. If the rule is resource monotonic,
the projection of the path for c onto RN0 actually coincides with the path
for cN0. For the example constructed here, the projection is a strict subset.
The proof of the next result is also by means of an example. We use
the following rule as an ingredient and the fact that this rule is bilaterally
consistent.16
Constrained equal awards rule, CEA: For each (c;E) 2 CN and each
i 2 N,
CEAi(c;E) ´ minfci;¸g;
where ¸ ¸ 0 is chosen so as to achieve e±ciency.
15The path for c consists of two connected components. One is a broken segment in ¯ve
parts; the other is also a broken segment in ¯ve parts. The two components are symmetric
of each other with respect to c
2 except that the ¯fth segment of the ¯rst component is open
at its highest endpoint, whereas the ¯fth segment of the second component, counting down




16The constrained equal awards rule appears in Maimonides (Aumann and Maschler,
1985).
11Proposition 2 Anonymity is not lifted from the two-claimant case to the
general case by bilateral consistency.17
Proof: Let ® > 0 be given and consider the following rule: For each N 2 N

















¯ ® 6= ci < 2®
ª
.




jN®j if i 2 N®;
0 otherwise.





® ¡ ¸ if i 2 N®;
2¸ if i 2 N+;
0 if i 2 N¡;
where ¸ 2 [0;®) is uniquely determined by (® ¡ ¸)jN®j + 2¸jN+j = E.





CEAi(cN+;E) if i 2 N+;
0 otherwise.
Case (iv): N+ 6= ;, ®jN®j < E, and
P
i2N+ ci · E <
P












jN®j if i 2 N®;
ci if i 2 N+;
0 if i 2 N¡:
Case (v):
P





® if i 2 N®;





j2N+ cj ¡ ®jN®j
¢
if i 2 N¡:
17Since the rule we construct to prove this result is 2-continuous, the same example
actually shows that, in the language of Section 4, 2-continuity provide no assistance in
lifting 2-anonymity. Note that this rule could also be used to prove the point, already

































(e) ci ¸ 2® and cj ¸ 2®.
Figure 3: The two-claimant case.
Case (vi): 1 2 N+ and 2®jN+j · ®jN®j = E. Then,
Si(c;E) ´
½
® if i 2 N®;
0 otherwise.





CEAi(cN+;E) if i 2 N+;
0 otherwise:
Case (viii): 1 62 N+ 6= ;, and
P















jN®j if i 2 N®;
ci if i 2 N+;
0 if i 2 N¡:
Note that cases (vi), (vii), and (viii) do not apply when there are only two
claimants, and that the de¯nition of S is anonymous except for these three
cases. Thus, in the two-claimant case, S is anonymous. (See also Figure 3.)
As panels (f) and (g) of Figure 4 show, it is not anonymous in general. We


















(b) cj = ® 6= ci < 2® and





















(d) ci ¸ 2®, cj ¸ 2®, and











(e) cj ¸ 2®, ® 6= ci < 2®, and
















(g) cj = ck = ®, ci ¸ 2®, and i 6= 1
Figure 4: The three-claimant case. From panels (f) and (g), it can be seen that
anonymity is violated when ci = c1.
14Let N 2 N with jNj ¸ 3, (c;E) 2 CN, x ´ S(c;E), and N0 ½ N with
jN0j = 2. We want to show that xN0 = S(cN0;
P
i2N0 xi). Let N0 ´ fi;jg,
E0 ´ xi + xj, and (yi;yj) ´ S(cN0;E0). Since yi + yj = xi + xj, it is enough
to show that either yi = xi or yj = xj.
First, suppose that i;j 2 N®. If any of cases (i), (ii) with ¸ > 0, (iv), or
(viii) applies to (c;E), then E0 < 2® and case (i) applies to (cN0;E0). Thus,
yi = E0
2 = xi. If any of cases (ii) with ¸ = 0, (v), or (vi) applies to (c;E),
then E0 = 2® and case (v) applies to (cN0;E0). Thus, yi = ® = x. If either of
case (iii) or case (vii) applies to (c;E), then E0 = 0 and hence yi = 0 = xi.
Suppose that i;j 2 N+. If either case (i) or case (vi) applies to (c;E),
then E0 = 0 and hence yi = 0 = xi. If case (ii) applies to (c;E), then
E0 < 4® and the same case applies to (cN0;E0). Thus, yi = E0
2 = xi. If either
case (iii) or case (vii) applies to (c;E), then 4® · E0 · ci + cj and either
case (iii) or case (iv) applies to (cN0;E0). If case (iii) applies to (c;E), since
CEA is bilaterally consistent, yi = xi. In case (iv), yi = ci = xi. If any
of cases (iv), (v), or (viii) applies to (c;E), then E0 = ci + cj and case (v)
applies to (cN0;E0). Thus, yi = ci = xi.
Suppose that i;j 2 N¡. If case (v) applies to (c;E), then the same case
applies to (cN0;E0). Since CEA is bilaterally consistent, yi = xi. If any other
case applies to (c;E), then E0 = 0 and hence yi = 0 = xi.
Suppose that i 2 N® and j 2 N+. If case (i) applies to (c;E), then E0 < ®
and the same case applies to (cN0;E0). Thus, yj = 0 = xj. If case (ii) applies
to (c;E), then E0 = ®+¸ < 2® and the same case applies to (cN0;E0). With
the same ¸, we have ® ¡ ¸ + 2¸ = E0. Thus, yi = ® ¡ ¸ = xi. If either
case (iii) or case (vii) applies to (c;E), then 2® · E0 = xj · cj and either
case (iii) or case (iv) applies to (cN0;E0). In both cases, yi = 0 = xi. If any
of cases (iv), (v), or (viii) applies to (c;E), then ® < E0 · cj + ® and either
case (iv) or case (v) applies to (cN0;E0). In both cases, yj = cj = xj. If
case (vi) applies to (c;E), then E0 = ® < 2® and case (ii) applies to (cN0;E0)
with ¸ = 0. Thus, yi = ® = xi.
Suppose that i 2 N® and j 2 N¡. If any of cases (ii) with ¸ = 0, (v), or
(vi) applies to (c;E), then ® · E0 and case (v) applies to (cN0;E0). Thus,
yi = ® = xi. If any other case applies to (c;E), then E0 < ® and case (i)
applies to (cN0;E0). Thus, yj = 0 = xj.
Finally, suppose that i 2 N+ and j 2 N¡. If any of cases (i), (ii) with
¸ = 0, or (vi) applies to (c;E), then E0 = 0 and hence yi = 0 = xi. If
any of cases (ii) with ¸ > 0, (iii), (iv), (vii), or (viii) applies to (c;E), then
E0 = xi · ci and one of cases (ii), (iii), or (v) with E0 = ci applies to (cN0;E0).
15In these cases, yj = 0 = xj. If case (v) applies to (c;E), then ci · E0 and
the same case applies to (cN0;E0). Thus, yi = ci = xi. ¤
4 Assisted lifting
In our second lifting theorem, the hypothesis is made on the rule that it
is resource-monotonic. Theorem 1c states that this property is lifted, so it
su±ces to impose it in the two-claimant case. The theorem pertains to the
following properties:
² If the endowment increases, of two claimants, the award to the one with
the larger claim should increase by at least as much as the award to the one
with the smaller claim:18
Super-modularity: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, each ¹ E 2 [0;E], and
each pair fi;jg µ N, if ci · cj, then Si(c;E)¡Si(c; ¹ E) · Sj(c;E)¡Sj(c; ¹ E).
² If an agent's claim is such that by substituting it to the claim of any other
agent whose claim is higher, there is now enough to compensate everyone,
then the agent should be fully compensated:19
Conditional full compensation: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and
each i 2 N, if
P
j2N minfcj;cig · E, then Si(c;E) = ci.
² If an agent's claim satis¯es the hypothesis of conditional full compensation,
he should receive nothing in the problem in which the endowment is what it
was initially minus the sum of the claims:
Conditional null compensation: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and
each i 2 N, if
P
j2N minfcj;cig · E, then Si(c;
P
ck ¡ E) = 0.
Conditional full compensation and conditional null compensation are dual
properties (Herrero and Villar, 2002).
² If an agent's claim increases, he should receive at least as much as he did
initially:
18This property is formulated by Dagan, Serrano, and Volij (1997).
19The property is formulated by Herrero and Villar (2002) under the name of \sustain-
ability", and so is the next one, under the name of \independence of residual claims".
16Claims monotonicity: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, each i 2 N,
and each ¹ ci > ci, we have Si(¹ ci;c¡i;E) ¸ Si(c;E).
² If an agent's claim and the endowment increase by the same amount, what
he receives should increase by at most that amount.20
Linked claim-resource monotonicity: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN,
each i 2 N, and each ± > 0, we have Si(ci + ±;c¡i;E + ±) ¡ Si(c;E) · ±.
Claims monotonicity and linked claim-resource monotonicity are dual
properties (Thomson and Yeh, 2002):
Finally are two invariance requirements.
² One should be able to solve a problem in either one of the following two
ways, either directly, or by ¯rst truncating claims at the endowment:21
Claims truncation invariance: For each N 2 N and each (c;E) 2 CN,
S(c;E) = S(t(c;E);E), where for each i 2 N, ti(c;E) ´ minfci;Eg.
² One should be able to solve a problem in either one of the following two
ways, either directly, or by ¯rst attributing to each claimant his \minimal
right", de¯ned to be the di®erence between the endowment and the sum of
the claims of the other agents (or zero if this di®erence is negative).22
Minimal rights ¯rst: For each N 2 N and each (c;E) 2 CN, S(c;E) =
m(c;E) + S(c ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
P
mi(c;E)).23
Claims truncation invariance and minimal rights ¯rst are dual properties
(Herrero and Villar, 2001).
The proof of one of the statements of Theorem 2 below will also involve
an additional lemma relating three properties, two of which we have already
encountered and an additional one pertaining to a thought experiment that
is the converse to that underlying bilateral consistency: it allows to deduce
the desirability of a proposed awards vector x for some problem from the
20This property is formulated by Thomson and Yeh (2002).
21This property is formulated by Dagan and Volij (1993).
22This property is formulated by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987).
23Note this is a well-de¯ned problem.
17desirability of the restriction of x to each two-claimant subgroup for the
reduced problem obtained by imagining the departure of the members of
the complementary group with their awards. If x is such that for each two-
claimant subgroup, its restriction to that subgroup would be chosen by the
rule for the associated reduced problem, then it should be chosen by the rule
for the initial problem.24
Converse consistency: For each N 2 N with jNj ¸ 3, each (c;E) 2 CN,
and each x 2 RN such that
P
xi = E, if for each N0 ½ N with jN0j = 2, we
have xN0 = S(cN0;
P
N0 xi), then x = S(c;E).
The following Lemma is an easy consequence of the facts that 2-resource
monotonicity is lifted and that if a rule is resource monotonic and bilaterally
consistent, it is conversely consistent (Chun, 1999).
Lemma 2 If a rule is 2-resource monotonic and bilaterally consistent, it is
conversely consistent.
Theorem 2 The following properties are lifted from the two-claimant case





(d) conditional full compensation and conditional null compensation;
(e) claims monotonicity and linked claim-resource monotonicity;
(f) claims truncation invariance and minimal rights ¯rst.
In the light of this theorem, it should be no surprise that the examples of
rules used to prove Propositions 1 and 2 are not 2-resource monotonic.
Proof: For each implication, let S be a rule satisfying the hypotheses.
(a) Anonymity. Let N, ¹ N 2 N with jNj = j ¹ Nj ¸ 3, (c;E) 2 CN and
¹ c 2 R
¹ N be such that there is a bijection ¼: N ! ¹ N such that for each i 2 N,
ci = ¹ c¼(i). We argue by contradiction. Suppose that there is ` 2 N such
that x` ´ S`(c;E) 6= S¼(`)(¹ c;E) ´ ¹ x¼(`). Then, there are i;j 2 N such that
xi > ¹ x¼(i) and xj < ¹ x¼(j). By bilateral consistency, (xi;xj) = S(ci;cj;xi +xj)
24The literature concerning this property is surveyed by Thomson (2006a).
18and (¹ x¼(i); ¹ x¼(j)) = S(ci;cj; ¹ x¼(i) + ¹ x¼(j)). The problems (ci;cj;xi + xj) 2
Cfi;jg and (ci;cj; ¹ x¼(i) + ¹ x¼(j)) 2 Cf¼(i);¼(j)g involve two di®erent set of agents,
and they (possibly) di®er only in the endowment. By 2-anonymity and 2-
resource monotonicity, we should have (xi;xj) = (¹ x¼(i); ¹ x¼(j)) or (xi;xj) 5
(¹ x¼(i); ¹ x¼(j)), which we know not to be true.
(b) Super-modularity. Let N 2 N with jNj ¸ 3, (c;E) 2 CN, and ¹ E > E be
such that (c; ¹ E) 2 CN. Let i;j 2 N be such that ci · cj and N0 ´ fi;jg.
Let x ´ S(c;E) and ¹ x ´ S(c; ¹ E). We need to show that ¹ xi ¡ xi · ¹ xj ¡ xj.
By 2-resource monotonicity and Theorem 1c, for each k 2 N, xk · ¹ xk. By
bilateral consistency, xN0 = S(cN0;
P
N0 xk) and ¹ xN0 = S(cN0;
P





N0 ¹ xk. By 2-super-modularity, ¹ xi ¡ xi · ¹ xj ¡ xj.
(c) Self-duality. Let N 2 N and (c;E) 2 CN. Let x ´ S(c;E) and
y ´ Sd(c;E). We need to show that x = y. We argue by contradiction.
Suppose that for some i 2 N, xi < yi. Then, there is j 2 N n fig such that
xj > yj. Let N0 ´ fi;jg. Since S is bilaterally consistent, so is Sd. Also,
S and Sd coincide in the two-claimant case. Thus, xN0 = S(cN0;
P
N0 xk)
and yN0 = Sd(cN0;
P
N0 yk) = S(cN0;
P





N0 yk) (possibly) di®er only in the endowment, and by 2-resource
monotonicity, we should have xN0 = yN0 or xN0 5 yN0, which we know not to
be true.
(d) Conditional full compensation. Let N 2 N with jNj ¸ 3, (c;E) 2 CN,
and x ´ S(c;E). Let i 2 N be such that
P
j2N minfcj;cig · E. We need to
show that xi = ci. We argue by contradiction. Suppose that xi < ci.
First, we claim that there is j 2 N n fig such that xj > ci. Indeed, if for




j2N minfcj;cig · E,
a contradiction.
Let N0 ´ fi;jg. By bilateral consistency, xN0 = S(cN0;
P
N0 xk). Since
ci < xj · cj, then (cN0;2ci) 2 Cfi;jg. Moreover, by 2-conditional full com-
pensation, S(cN0;2ci) = (ci;ci). The problems (cN0;
P
N0 xk) and (cN0;2ci)
(possibly) di®er only in the endowment, and by 2-resource monotonicity, we
should have xN0 = cN0 or xN0 5 cN0, which we know not to be true.
The proof for conditional null compensation follows from the statement
just proved, the facts that this property is dual to conditional full compen-
sation, that resource monotonicity is a self-dual property, and Lemma 1.
(e) Claims monotonicity. Let N 2 N with jNj ¸ 3 and (c;E) 2 CN. Let
i 2 N and ¹ c 2 RN
+ be such that ¹ ci > ci and for each j 2 Nnfig, ¹ cj = cj. Let
19x ´ S(c;E) and ¹ x ´ S(¹ c;E). We need to show that ¹ xi ¸ xi. We argue by
contradiction. Suppose that ¹ xi < xi.
Let j 2 Nnfig and N0 ´ fi;jg. We assert that
P
N0 ¹ xk <
P
N0 xk.
By bilateral consistency, xN0 = S(cN0;
P
N0 xk) and ¹ xN0 = S(¹ ci;cj;
P
N0 ¹ xk).
Suppose by contradiction that
P
N0 ¹ xk ¸
P
N0 xk. By 2-resource mono-
tonicity, Si(¹ ci;cj;
P
N0 xk) · Si(¹ ci;cj;
P
N0 ¹ xk). By 2-claims monotonicity,
Si(ci;cj;
P
N0 xk) · Si(¹ ci;cj;
P
N0 xk). Hence, xi = S(cN0;
P
N0 xk) · Si(¹ ci;cj; ¹ xi+
¹ xj) = ¹ xi < xi, which is a contradiction.
Since ¹ xi < xi, then for at least one j 2 N, ¹ xj > xj. Let N0 ´ fi;jg. By bi-
lateral consistency, xN0 = S(cN0;
P
N0 xk) and ¹ xN0 = S(¹ ci;cj;
P
N0 ¹ xk). By the
previous paragraph,
P
N0 ¹ xk <
P
N0 xk, so that by 2-resource-monotonicity,
Sj(¹ ci;cj;
P
N0 xk) ¸ Sj(¹ ci;cj;
P
N0 ¹ xk) = ¹ xj > xj. By 2-claims monotonicity,
Si(¹ ci;cj;
P
N0 xk) ¸ Si(cN0;
P





xi + xj, which contradicts the e±ciency of S.
The proof for linked claim-resource monotonicity follows from the state-
ment just proved, the facts that this property is dual to claims monotonicity,
that resource monotonicity is a self-dual property, and Lemma 1.
(f) Claims truncation invariance. Let N 2 N with jNj ¸ 3 and (c;E) 2 CN.
Let x ´ S(t(c;E);E). We will show that x = S(c;E). Let N0 ´ fi;jg ½ N.
By bilateral consistency, xN0 = S(tN0(c;E);
P
N0 xk). Let E0 ´
P
N0 xk. By 2-
claims truncation invariance, S(tN0(c;E);E0) = S(t(tN0(c;E);E0);E0). Since
E0 · E, then t(tN0(c;E);E0) = tN0(c;E0), so that xN0 = S(tN0(c;E0);E0).
Also, by 2-claims truncation invariance, S(tN0(c;E0);E0) = S(t(cN0;E0) =
S(cN0;E0). Thus, recalling the de¯nition of E0, we have obtained xN0 =
S(cN0;
P
N0 xk). This conclusion can be reached for each fi;jg ½ N. Thus,
by converse consistency, which holds by Lemma 2, x = S(c;E), as asserted.
The proof for minimal rights ¯rst follows from the statement just proved,
the facts that this property is dual to claims truncation invariance, that
resource monotonicity is a self-dual property, and Lemma 1. ¤
Theorem 2a can also be proved as follows: (i) 2-anonymity implies 2-
equal treatment of equals; (ii) 2-equal treatment of equals and 2-resource
monotonicity are lifted by bilateral consistency (Theorem 1a,c); (iii) re-
source monotonicity and bilateral consistency together imply consistency
(Chun, 1999); (iv) equal treatment of equals and consistency imply anonymity
(Chambers and Thomson, 2002). The same argument can be used to prove
that the ¯xed-population version of 2-anonymity is lifted.
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